Abstract-Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies that allow a player to unilaterally control the linear combinations of its own and other players' expected rewards in iterated games have recently found wide applications. However, existing ZD strategies mainly focus on some specific scenarios with restrictions on the number of players or actions a player can take. Targeting wider applications and better performance, the ZD strategies along with corresponding existence conditions for general multi-player multi-action iterated games are developed in this work, including existing ones as special cases. In addition, an interesting fact that every player can have at most one master player (that can control the expected reward of the given player) is revealed.
multiple transmission power levels are allowed. Other potential applications of the proposed ZD strategy include maintaining weighted social welfare in cooperative wireless communication networks [5] , stabilizing frequency in smart grid [6] , and providing quality-of-service in femto-cell networks [4] .
II. GENERAL K × N ITERATED GAMES
A general K × N iterated game among K players where each player-k (1 ≤ k ≤ K) has an action space A k consisting of N actions is considered. Background on basic iterated games can be found in [1] . In the following, notations for the general K × N iterated game are introduced. Particularly, the tuple (a i1 , . . . , a iK ) ∈ A A 1 × . . . × A K will be used to represent the case that player-k takes the i k -th (i k ∈ {1, . . . , N}) action a i k ∈ A k , where A is the set of all the N K possible action tuples. In addition, for ease of presentation, an index i ∈ I defined as i = 1 + K k=1 (i k − 1)N K−k is assigned to each action-tuple (a i1 , . . . , a iK ) ∈ A, with I {1, . . . , N K } the corresponding action-tuple index set. In the iterated game, the action-tuple (a i1 , . . . , a iK ) of the previous round is defined as the current state s i of the game, and the set of possible states is defined as S A; the index i of a state s i ∈ S is given by that of the corresponding action-tuple (a i1 , . . . , a iK ). At each round, players choose their actions with probabilities depending on the current state and hence the game states form a Markov chain. 1 The strategy matrix of player-k is denoted by p
with |S| the cardinality of S and p k i,j the probability of taking action a j ∈ A k at state s i ∈ S. The reward vector of player-k is denoted by
T where u k i is the reward corresponding to players' current actions (a i1 , . . . , a iK ) with i ∈ I the index of (a i1 , . . . , a iK ).
III. ZERO-DETERMINANT STRATEGIES FOR 2 × 2 GAMES
When K = 2 and N = 2, the above general setting reduces to the 2 × 2 game considered in [1] , [5] , [6] , where the number of states |S| = 4. For a given strategy pair p 1 and p 2 of the two players, the transition matrix M of the game state is given by 
DefineM = M − I with I the identity matrix, it follows that
and further by Cramer's rule, we have
asM has a zero eigenvalue implied by (3) . By comparing (3) and (4), it can be noted that every row of Adj(M) is proportional to π, and hence for any vector
T and strategy pair p 1 and p 2 , it can be shown through some nontrivial derivations that [1] ; see (5) , shown at the bottom of the page, 
where the last equality holds since determinant remains unchanged if the second column of M f are added to the first one. A key observation is that the first column of M f is solely under the control of player-1.
Consider, in particular, f = α 0 1 + α 1 u 1 + α 2 u 2 , (with 1 the all-one vector and α k ∈ R, for k = 0, 1, 2), then we have
when p 1 is such that the first column is proportional to the last column in the corresponding M f ; and such p 1 is termed the ZD strategy of player-1 [1] . This implies that player-1 can control the weighted reward α 1ū 1 + α 2ū 2 irrespective to player-2's strategy (if such p 1 exists); and similar analysis can be applied to player-2 as well. As an example, the following result gives the ZD strategy of player-1 for controlling its own expected reward (corresponding to α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 0) and the corresponding existence conditions [1] , [2] .
n,min ) is the maximum (minimum) reward of player-1 when he takes the n -th (n-th) action, then, irrespective to the strategy of player-2, any valueũ
can be achieved by player-1; without loss of generality, assume n = 1, and then the corresponding ZD strategies of player-1 are given by 
IV. ZERO-DETERMINANT STRATEGIES FOR MULTI-PLAYER MULTI-ACTION GAMES
In this section, the ZD strategies for the general K × N iterated games described in Section II will be presented, which include the ZD strategies in [1] , [2] , [4] as special cases. Also, the fact that each player can have at most one master player will be shown.
A. ZD Strategy for General Iterated Games
Proposition 1 below provides the existence condition and the specific form of the ZD strategies (for player-1) in general K × N iterated games.
Proposition 1: For a K-player N -action iterated game and a set of given coefficients {α 1 
where I| i k =n (I| i k =n ) denotes the set of action-tuples with player-k (not) taking the n-th action. Then, 1) the action index n (for player-1) is unique; 2) irrespective to the strategies of other players, player-1 can set the expected weighted social welfare
4 by taking any strategy that satisfies 4 Note that a player may be able to remove some actions from its action set (and then add duplicated actions back to keep the total number of actions N unchanged) to minimize u α m =n,max , so as to obtain the largest possible range forũ α .
where Proof: Given existence, the uniqueness of the action index n can be proved by contradiction using (7).
As to the second part of the proposition, it can be first verified that (8) defines valid probability measures, i.e., p
for all i ∈ I, when (7) and (9) hold. To show that the chosen expected weighted social welfareũ α can be achieved irrespective to other players' actions, assume without loss of generality n = 1. Further assuming that the other players take arbitrary strategies {p k } (for k = 2, . . . , K), the state transition matrix M of the corresponding iterated game is given by (10), shown at the bottom of the page.
Using similar arguments as in (3)- (5), it can be shown that, for any |S| × 1 vector f , (11) holds. It is worth noting that the first column of the matrix M f in (11) is solely under player-1's control. See (11), shown at the bottom of the page.
When f = −ũ α 1 + K k=1 α k u k and p 1 satisfies (8), it can be verified that the first column is proportional to the last column (with ratio −ũ α /α 0 ) in M f , resulting in a zero determinant in (11). Therefore, it has
=0 due to zero determinant in (11)
where the second equality is due to the fact that π T · 1 = 1 and the definition ofū k given in (2). Setting α 1 = 1 and α k = 0 for k > 1, Proposition 1 gives the following corollary, which specifies how player-1 can set its own expected reward irrespective to other players' strategies.
Corollary 1: For a K-player N -action iterated game, if ∃n ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that
then (1) 
where α 0 ∈ (0, min{ũ
with u 1 max and u 1 min denoting the maximum and the minimum possible rewards of player-1, respectively.
Remark 3: Note that the ZD strategy presented in [2] generalizes Theorem 1 to the cases of K > 2 and is included by Corollary 1 here as a special case of N = 2.
Similarly, player-1 can set the expected reward of player-k (k = 1) based on the following corollary.
Corollary 2: For a K-player N -action iterated game, if ∃n ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that
where 
C. Uniqueness of Master Player
Seeing Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, a natural question is that what will happen when two players set different values on the expected reward for the same player? Regarding this, it will be shown in the following that such situation can never happen, except for the degenerated case.
Definition 1: For a given player, its master player is the one that has a valid ZD strategy to control the expected reward of this given player. More specifically, player-k is the master player of player-k if and only if ∃n ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that
Proposition 2: Each player k cannot have two different master players k and k , except for the degenerated case where equality holds in (17) for both k and k (with possibly a different action index n ) and both players k and k set the same expected reward u k n ,min for player-k. Proof: Suppose by contradiction that player-k has two different master players k and k in non-degenerated cases. Then, ∃n , n ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that
and at least one of (18) 
where
denotes the set of indices such that i k = n and i k = n (i k = n and i k = n ) in the corresponding action-tuples. However, (19-21) imply
which contradicts to (18).
V. CONCLUSIONS
The ZD strategy for general multi-player multi-action iterated games is developed in this work, and the fact that every player can have at most one master player is revealed. The proposed strategy can extend existing ZD strategy based schemes to more general settings (e.g., more players and more actions) and may also find wider applications in the future.
APPENDIX A NO ADVANTAGE FOR LONG-MEMORY
Proof: Denote H i as the recent history (of past actions) shared by players whose index k ≥ i, and accordingly the history recorded by player-k is {H 1 , . . . , H k }. To show that long-memory player has no advantage over shortmemory player in terms of expected reward, it is sufficient [1] to show that the expectation of the joint probability  P (a i1 , . . . , a iK |H 1 P (a 1 , . . . , a K |H 1 , . . . , H K−1 ) ] .
(23)
